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The Military-Environmental Complex
Summary
Although the military’s operations are largely exempt from environmental laws and regulations when
those laws conflict with its national security mission, the military has important incentives to reduce its
reliance on fossil fuels and combat climate change. If nurtured properly, the military’s extensive
undertaking to improve its sustainable energy use and reduce demand for fossil-fuel-derived energy has
the potential to become one important tool in the environmental regulatory toolkit.
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The Military-Environmental
Complex 1
Sarah E. Light
The U.S. military and its mission to enhance and defend national
security often are perceived to be at odds with environmental
protection and sustainability.
Indeed, when it comes to energy use, the
Department of Defense (DoD) is the single
largest consumer of energy in the nation, as
well as the single largest emitter of greenhouse gases. The military’s total energy costs
in fiscal year 2011 were $19.3 billion: $4.1
billion to power its facilities, and $15.2 billion for operational energy expenses related
to military combat operations. The DoD
is the nation’s largest landlord; it manages
more than 500 installations in the United
States and overseas, covering approximately
2.3 billion square feet of building space. The
DoD also manages approximately 28 million acres of land in the United States. This
physical footprint translates into an enormous carbon footprint. Spanning its vast
and varied facilities and global operations
on land, air, and sea, the military’s energy
needs are both deep and broad.2 Despite the
significant impact that its energy needs have
on the environment, the military’s opera-

tions are largely exempt from environmental laws and regulations when those laws
conflict with the military’s national security
mission.
Yet in reality, the military’s mission of
ensuring national security is deeply intertwined with the need to reduce energy use
and develop alternative and renewable fuel
sources. While the military is not likely to
become the environment’s greatest advocate
overnight, it has important incentives to
reduce its reliance on fossil fuels and combat
climate change. Fuel convoys supporting
combat missions are under constant threat.
From 2003 to 2007 in Iraq and Afghanistan,
more than 3,000 Army personnel and contractors were wounded or killed in action as
a result of attacks on fuel and water resupply
convoys. Reducing the military’s reliance
on petroleum and developing alternative
energy sources such as solar power therefore
could help save lives. Likewise, the mission
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of national security drives the military to
ensure that its installations and facilities are
protected from disruptions to the electric
grid—not just from possible cyber-attack,
but from climate-change related natural
disasters. The military also recognizes that
climate change is likely to carry significant
and destabilizing geopolitical impacts,
contributing to poverty and food and water
scarcity, and thereby increasing the likelihood of armed confrontations between
nations over access to resources. That the
Russian Navy is now patrolling shipping
lanes in the Arctic Ocean newly opened
from melting ice only underscores the
impact of climate change on potential areas
of conflict. Consequently, while the law
suggests that the military may disregard
environmental laws if they conflict with
its national security mission, the military
has political and economic incentives that
prompt it to do more than the law requires
in the area of sustainable energy use.
The exceptional alignment between the
military mission and the need to conserve
energy, address climate change, and develop
renewables, brings equally exceptional
potential: for stimulating the development
of new technologies, providing large-scale
commercial support for existing technologies, and helping to drive behavioral
changes on a grand scale. Policymakers need
to think carefully about how to harness this
alignment, and how cooperation between
the military and the private sector can
advance these ends. If nurtured properly, the
military’s extensive undertaking to improve
its sustainable energy use and reduce
demand for fossil-fuel-derived energy both
on the battlefield and in permanent installations, in which the military’s interests are
intertwined with those of Congress, the
President, and the private sector—what I
call the Military-Environmental Complex—
has the potential to become one important
tool in the regulatory toolkit to combat
climate change.
Military stimulation of technologi1
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cal development during has deep roots. At
its height during the twentieth century,
military needs played a major role in driving
the development of new technologies such
as semiconductors, the global positioning
system, the Internet, and computers that
not only transformed war fighting, but the
civilian realm as well. Both military-driven
innovation (R&D) and procurement from
the private sector drove this innovation. As
a first user of new environmental technologies, the military not only can help evaluate
their effectiveness, but by its very size creates a needed market to simulate innovation, as it has done in the past with aircraft,
electronics, and the internet. The mere fact
that a project supports military interests—
rather than general commercial interests—
may drive support among other institutional
players who may feel more strongly connected to the value of protecting national
security than other values such as energy
independence or environmental protection.
Moreover, the DoD’s exceptional hierarchical nature allows its leadership to consider
the importance of changing norms and
behavior in ways that might be unthinkable
in the private sector. In the long run, the
Military-Environmental Complex and the
relationships it both builds upon and engenders between the military and the private
sector could have important consequences
not only for the development and commercialization of clean energy technologies
that have widespread civilian applications,
but also for the diffusion of environmental
practices into the broader population.
At the same time, it is important to be
cautious in relying upon this exceptional
alignment between the military’s mission
and society’s needs to develop clean energy
technology. As historical lessons from the
military-industrial complex demonstrate,
there is the potential for rent-seeking behavior by elected representatives, private firms
and industry that must be addressed.
This brief examines the governmental
and corporate actors—and the public-private

partnerships between them—that propel the
Military-Environmental Complex, pointing
out its enormous potential benefits and well
as the possible pitfalls, and concludes with
recommendations for further research and
future policymaking.

GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS
DRIVING THE MILITARYENVIRONMENTAL COMPLEX
While the potential of the MilitaryEnvironmental Complex has yet to be fully
tapped, Congress and the White House, as
well as the DoD itself, already have been
taking steps to encourage its development—
despite the exemptions that are given to the
military under environmental and administrative law.
In addition to Congressional mandates
that instruct all federal agencies to promote
energy conservation, efficiency, and renewable sourcing, Congress has directed the
DoD specifically to reduce energy demand
and develop alternative renewable energy
sources, primarily in its facilities. For example, Congress has required that by fiscal year
2025, the DoD produce or procure at least
25 percent of the energy it consumes within
its facilities from renewable energy sources.
Congress also has directed the DoD to consider using solar or other forms of renewable
energy for facilities construction projects
(including housing), to use energy-efficient
(Energy Star/FEMP) products in such housing, and to prefer energy-efficient equipment generally. Congress has mandated
too that the DoD prefer hybrid, electric or
plug-in vehicles that are of reasonable cost
and meet Departmental needs.3
Congress has provided additional financial incentives for the DoD to meet these
goals. The DoD is authorized to reinvest
half of its energy cost savings into additional conservation measures, and half into
location-specific improvements for service
members. Congress also permits the DoD
to sell to a utility company the electricity it

refer to the working paper or the article.

Interior, Interior and Defense Departments Join Forces

Environmental and Energy Study Institute, Fact Sheet:

to Promote Renewable Energy on Federal Lands (Aug.

4

10 U.S.C. §§ 2911, 2912, 2916, 2922a.

The Penn Wharton Public Policy Initiative is grateful to the

DoD’s Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Initia-

6, 2012), available at http://www.defense.gov/releases/

5

Federal Leadership in Environmental, Energy, and Eco-

editors of the Boston College Law Review for permission

tives (July 2011); Department of Defense Annual Energy

release.aspx?releaseid=15498.

to use this material. A working version of the article

Management Report for Fiscal Year 2011, 1 & n.2, 14

also is available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.

(Sept. 2012), http://www.acq.osd.mil/ie/energy/library/

2922b; 10 U.S.C. § 2922f; 10 U.S.C. § 2922g (the

cfm?abstract_id=2332195. For fuller citations, please

FY.2011.AEMR.PDF; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of

preference for hybrid, electric or plug-in vehicles does not

in the May 2014 issue of the Boston College Law Review.

2

3

apply to “tactical vehicles designed for use in combat.”).

nomic Performance, Exec. Order 13514, Section 1, 74

10 U.S.C. § 2911(e); 10 U.S.C. § 2915; 10 U.S.C. §

Fed. Reg. 52117, 52117 (Oct. 5, 2009).
6

Strengthening Federal Environmental, Energy, and Transportation Management, Exec. Order 13423, 72 Fed. Reg.

produces from alternative or cogeneration
facilities under the DoD’s jurisdiction, and
to credit any proceeds to the appropriation
account for the supply of electricity. Perhaps
most importantly, the DoD can enter into
30-year Power Purchase Agreements with
private developers to promote the development of alternative energy generation on
military lands. These contracts stimulate
the generation of alternative and renewable energy sources with significant private
investment. Private developers build and
own the generation equipment, while the
military enters into long-term contracts to
purchase the electricity produced, thus guaranteeing stable demand for a sufficient time
period for the private financiers to recoup
their investment. The DoD is unique among
federal agencies in this ability to enter into
such long-term agreements.4
The White House likewise has directed
all federal agencies, including the DoD, to
improve their energy profile so as to lead
the nation by example. Executive orders
issued by President George W. Bush and
President Barak Obama have set goals for
the use of renewable energy and directed
agencies to establish targets for reductions in greenhouse gas emissions and
water consumption. For example, in 2009,
President Obama signed Executive Order
13,514, which requires all Federal government agencies to disclose greenhouse gas
emissions information annually from their
direct and indirect activities. The Order also
directs each agency to propose to the White
House agency-wide greenhouse gas reduction targets to reach by 2020 as compared to
a 2008 baseline.5 Executive Order 13,423,
signed by President Bush in 2007, similarly directed Federal agencies to improve
energy efficiency and reduce greenhouse
gas emissions and water consumption, to
require acquisition of sustainable goods,
and mandates sustainable federal vehicle
fleets.6 That Executive Order also built on
the Energy Policy Act of 2005’s requirement that federal agencies consume certain

set percentages of energy from renewable
sources by requiring that at least half of the
renewable energy come from “new” renewable sources, defined as “sources of renewable energy placed into service after January
1, 1999.”7
It is important to note that these Congressional mandates and executive orders
contain numerous exemptions related to
national security and military activities, and
thus apply only to the DoD’s use of energy
for its facilities, not for its operations (which
account for approximately 75 percent of the
DoD’s energy use).8 To target operations,
Congress instead directed that the DoD
create a new Office of Operational Energy

“The DoD’s actions not only
acknowledge the validity of
climate change; they recognize
it, along with fossil fuel use,
as a threat to the military’s
core mission and a drain on its
operations.”

reduce energy demand, increase efficiency
and explore alternative sources of fuel—in
particular, so that fewer lives will be lost
guarding extensive, petroleum-intensive fuel
convoys on the ground, and to increase the
military’s capabilities.
The DoD’s actions not only acknowledge the validity of climate change; they
recognize it, along with fossil fuel use, as a
threat to the military’s core mission and a
drain on its operations. The solution, from
the DoD’s perspective, is to reduce demand
for energy, to increase energy efficiency, and
to use renewable fuels that do not require
the same long “tail” to bring to the theater
of war. Energy efficiency and reduced use in
this way can enhance the functioning and
force of the military. Missions can go father
without refueling, running generators, or
bringing fuel convoys to the battlefield.
A focus on governmental institutional
drivers should not obscure the significant
role that the private sector plays in driving
the Military-Environmental Complex, both
as a source of technological innovation and a
source of funding.

COLLABORATION WITH THE
PRIVATE SECTOR

Plans and Programs, headed by an Assistant
Secretary of Defense, to focus the DoD’s
attention on reducing operational energy
use as well.
Beyond any legal mandates, however,
the DoD itself has been launching initiatives to reduce and become more efficient
in its energy use, to change behavior with
respect to energy consumption, and to
stimulate innovation and the development
of clean technology not only in its facilities, but in its military operations as well.
This internal motivation has largely come
from field commanders who have asked
the DoD to “unleash us from the tether of
fuel” to improve operational capacity and
reduce combat deaths.9 Again, this speaks
to the military’s internal incentives to

The Military-Environmental Complex is
characterized by a deep level of interconnectedness between the military and the
private sector.
First, the DoD, at times in cooperation
with other agencies, is providing funding to
private sector firms to finance the development of new renewable energy technologies
that ultimately may have civilian spinoff
potential in the energy sector. Government
funding is virtually essential for developing
and commercializing these new technologies, which currently are more expensive per
kilowatt/hour than conventional petroleum
and fossil-fuel based energy, in the absence
of a carbon tax on externalities or other
equivalent regulation. For example, under the
auspices of programs authorized by Congress

3913 (Jan. 26, 2007).

Less Fuel (Feb. 2008), available at http://www.acq.osd.

FY-2013; http://www.serdp.org/Featured-Initiatives/

content=title&utm_campaign=DetrickNOIAlert; http://

7

42 U.S.C. § 15852.

mil/dsb/reports/ADA477619.pdf (quoting James Mattis,

Installation-Energy.

www.armyeitf.com/index.php/opportunities/procure-

8

DoD, Energy for the Warfighter: Operational Energy Strat-

former Marine Corps Commanding General, 1st Marine

http://www1.eere.energy.gov/femp/financing/super-

mentactions; Notes of Interview with John Lushetsky,

egy (June 14, 2011), available at http://energy.defense.

Division, Operation Iraqi Freedom).

espcs_hill_afb.html; http://armyeitf.com/index.php/

http://www.serdp.org/News-and-Events/News-An-

component/content/article/67-news/procurement/15-

Defense Science Board, Report of the Defense Science

nouncements/Program-News/New-installation-energy-

detrick-noi?utm_source=NewsAlert&utm_

dyess.pdf; http://www1.eere.energy.gov/femp/pdfs/

Board Task Force on DoD Energy Strategy: More Fight –

and-water-technology-demonstrations-announced-for-

medium=email&utm_term=DetrickNOI&utm_

espc_ss_pendleton.pdf; http://www.amerienergygroup.

gov/OES_report_to_congress.pdf, at 3.
9

10

11

April 12, 2013 (notes on file with author).
12

http://www1.eere.energy.gov/femp/pdfs/espc_ss_

and the DoD in the 1990s, the DoD in 2009
launched its Installation Energy Test Bed
Initiative, which annually awards funding on
a competitive basis to projects submitted by
private firms, universities, national laboratories, and other organizations, involving the
management of installation (facility) energy.
Recent projects funded in 2013 included: a
battery energy storage system and microgrid
control system, a data-center liquid-cooling
system, high-concentration photovoltaics, a waste gasification system, technology
that can reduce air-conditioner energy use
through measuring operational energy efficiency, and a roof asset management system.
Smart microgrids, which have the ability to
reduce cost, increase the use of renewables,
and offer energy security, have been a particular emphasis of the Test Bed Initiative.10
DoD support for research and development of new technologies by private firms is
nothing new; this is a role that the military
has played, with much success, for many
decades already. The DoD’s resources can
make it possible for companies to explore
experimental and expensive alternative
energy technologies that venture capital
firms and banks would be reluctant or unable
to fund. And if such new energy technologies
and sustainable methods are a social good,
this demand for DoD financial and demand
support may be of great social benefit.
On the flip side of the private sector’s
demand for government financing lies the
DoD’s active quest for private financing as it
seeks energy security for its facilities. Under
its so-called “enhanced use lease” authority,
the DoD can lease property from its portfolio to private firms for large-scale renewable
energy generation projects. As noted above,
the DoD also has unique statutory authority
among federal agencies to enter into Power
Purchase Agreements (PPAs) of up to 30
years for the provision and operation of
energy production facilities and the purchase
of energy produced at these facilities. The
DoD is taking advantage of these special
allowances in the Army’s Energy Initiatives

POTENTIAL CONCERNS:
LESSONS FROM THE
MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL
COMPLEX
Despite the positive impact they may have
on the environment and the climate, these
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Task Force (EITF) program, created by the
Army in 2011. In keeping with Congress’s
mandate that the DoD produce or procure at
least 25 percent of its energy on installations
from renewable sources by 2025, the EITF
is facilitating the development of privatelyfinanced renewable energy generation facilities on Army installations, including solar,
wind, biomass and geothermal in order to
promote energy security.11
The DoD also has the statutory authority to enter into Energy Savings Performance
Contracts (ESPCs). These are partnerships
with private energy service companies, which
take responsibility for designing, financing,
installing, and maintaining energy saving
equipment for a client. The private firm
receives compensation based on the realization of a guaranteed stream of future savings,
and excess savings then accrue to the federal
government. Likewise, the DoD can become
part of Utility Energy Service Contracts
(UESCs), by which an agency enters into
a contract with a utility that agrees to pay
certain capital costs upfront to implement
selected energy conservation measures.
The DoD already has entered into
several of these types of arrangements. For
example, the Air Force entered into an
ESPC at Dyess Air Force Base in Texas,
through which it now procures 100% of its
energy through wind power. At Marine
Corps Base Camp Pendleton, using both
ESPCs and UESCs, the Marines achieved
a 44% reduction in energy use despite an
increase in the footprint of its facility of two
million square feet. Energy retrofits included
decommissioning a steam plant, incorporating photovoltaic arrays, changing fixtures and
using daylighting technology.12
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close ties between the private sector and the
DoD, which help drive the Military-Environmental Complex, also can be a potential
source of concern. Indeed, the militaryindustrial complex, out of which some of
these relationships in the clean energy arena
have grown, has largely pejorative connotations. Provisions in the annual DoD budget
authorizations between 2008-2013 suggest
that some members of Congress have
inserted requirements to benefit specific
firms, voter constituencies, and domestic
industries. For example, there are Congressional directives that encourage the DoD
to pursue alternative energy sources derived
specifically from coal—despite the fact
that coal-based fuel sources are unlikely to
avoid some of the difficulties that surround
other fossil fuels in operations. Similarly,
Congressional mandates, restrict the DoD’s
ability to use appropriated funds to obtain
Leadership in Energy and Environmental
Design (LEED) gold or platinum certification, apparently out of concern for the U.S.
timber industry, which is not privileged over
foreign sources in LEED’s scoring system.
As these details suggest, it is possible that
the military’s interest in sustainable energy
could be diverted to the creation of “pork”
projects that fail to serve the DoD’s mission
to enhance national security and increase
military capabilities.13
Similarly, many of the companies that
are set to work with the DoD on alternative energy projects are the same top-100
military contractors (determined by dollar
value of contracts) that have for years been
part of the so-called military-industrial
complex. These partners include Lockheed
Martin, the Boeing Corporation, Raytheon
Integrated Defense Systems, United Technologies Research Center, and Honeywell
International, Inc. So some caution may be
warranted to ensure that such contracts are
truly in the public interest, not merely the
pecuniary interest of the firms.
Finally, some historical examples from
the military-industrial complex in the 20th

century suggest that a “dual use” strategy –
promoting the interests of both the military
and society simultaneously – raise concerns
when the military is setting technological
specifications. It may reduce the potential for
civilian “spillover” if technologies are built
more closely to military specifications, rather
than to those that would benefit society as a
whole. It also raises the risk that the military
will, in order to obtain a comparative advantage internationally, want to hold promising
technologies close to the vest, rather than to
promote technology diffusion.
On the flip side, the relationship
between the military and the private sector
in this regard may have positive spillover
effects. It may be that the Military-Environmental Complex has the potential to influence some of these industrial giants to turn
more “green.” If their profit motive dovetails
with the military’s desire to reduce energy
consumption and promote renewables, then
this alignment may have the potential to
change the way large private firms and government contractors think and behave about
energy use. It may compel them to reconsider the war motive as the sole driver of
military contracts, and replace it (or at least
supplement it) with a sustainability motive.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The military is currently one of the most
important domestic players in the development and adoption of new and existing
technologies to reduce energy use and
promote renewables. It is crucial to get this
story right because it allows policymakers to recognize that there are potentially
substantial benefits for the environment to
the large-scale investments made in sustainable practices and technologies by the U.S.
military. What the Military-Environmental
Complex demonstrates is that a combination of approaches – directive, informational, behavioral, and self-initiated – are
likely to provide the best opportunity to
address climate change at a global level.

The dramatic scale at which the Military-Environmental Complex potentially can
address environmental problems therefore
should command greater attention from
scholars and policymakers going forward.
Specifically, it is important for scholars and
policymakers to consider how to promote
policies that unleash the positive potential of
the Military-Environmental Complex—that
both protect national security and the environment—while at the same time avoiding
the potential dangers and shortcomings, in
particular interest-group politics and rentseeking by private firms.
First, the President and Congress should
expand the financial incentives that encourage the military to reduce demand and invest
in renewables, and increase or expand the
mandatory renewable portfolio requirements
of 25 gigawatts by 2025 well beyond 2025.
This will ensure that all players—both within
the DoD and the private sector—understand that these investments in renewables
are long-term investments. To the extent
that Congress can incorporate additional
incentives for private firms to continue to
finance major renewables generation projects,
whether through the tax code or other legislative means, this could also save taxpayer
dollars in the long run.
Second, Congress should extend the
ability to use 30-year Power Purchase Agreements to agencies beyond the DoD—most
importantly, to the General Services Administration, which purchases energy on behalf
of other agencies. The potential to harness
private financing for large-scale renewable
projects should not be limited to the DoD
when other agencies own and manage land
that can also be put to use generating renewable sources of energy.
Third, successful dissemination of
technological innovation beyond government
agencies also requires openness, rather than
secrecy. Thus, to the extent that the military
is driving innovation, policymakers should
make sure that the policy and legal landscape
promote diffusion regarding technolo-

gies that can reduce conventional energy
demand and develop renewables, rather
than holding such technology close to the
vest in the name of national security. Given
the military’s role as a validator of climate
science, and its recognition that climate
change has the potential to increase violent
conflict in the world, diffusion is likely to
be in the military’s interests in this context.
In this vein, the DoD and the private sector
should create more platforms for sharing
best practices, experience with new technology, and information regarding potential
opportunities for private firms to invest in
innovation. As centers of innovation both in
technology and ideas, universities are ideally
situated to serve as mediators in this important dialogue.
Fourth, it is important to guard against
“pork projects” and improper manipulation
of the military’s interest in energy conservation and sustainability for private gain. More
empirical research is warranted as to whether
and in what circumstances there may be
“undue influence” as opposed to normal
political lobbying activity, and whether any
more must be done than the protections
already afforded by such laws as the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, the Honest
Leadership and Open Government Act of
2007, and the False Claims Act to prevent
rent-seeking and fraud. Such research might
include, for example, determining which
interest groups are contacting members of
Congress and the military to seek support for particular projects, whether firms
receiving funds or contracts are established
military contractors or new entrants to
the market, which geographic areas of the
country stand to benefit from these clean
energy projects, whether those projects are in
the interest of national security and reducing
climate change-related risks or are trying to
promote values other than the DoD’s core
mission, and what impact such contacts have
as to whether particular projects are funded.
Despite the need for further research
and continued caution, the Military-

Environmental Complex has already gone a
long way to encouraging a crucial dialogue
between government and the private sector,
and among government institutions, about
the goals of sustainability. With proper
oversight and encouragement, the MilitaryEnvironmental Complex may secure its place
within the regulatory toolkit as a way to
foster energy sustainability in the long term.

brief in brief
• Although the military’s operations are largely
exempt from environmental laws and
regulations when those laws conflict with
its national security mission, the military has
important incentives to reduce its reliance on
fossil fuels and combat climate change.
• If nurtured properly, the military’s extensive
undertaking to improve its sustainable energy
use and reduce demand for fossil-fuelderived energy has the potential to become
one important tool in the environmental
regulatory toolkit.
• To help this tool reach its potential, policy
changes are warranted to expand financial
incentives, extend the benefits of special
private financing arrangements, promote the
open dissemination of technological innovations, and guard against “pork projects” in
the energy sphere.
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